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Abstract: In the transition economy of Vietnam, financial market is dominated by 
banking sector but commercial banks heavily rely on collateral-based lending. While the 
relationship between collateral and implied credit risk is still in debate, this paper 
provides additional empirical evidence regarding the heterogeneous effects and 
transmission channels of collateral characteristics on loan delinquency. Applying 
instrumental variable probit analysis on a unique dataset of 2,295 internal loan accounts 
in Vietnam, we find the significantly negative impact of collateral quality on the 
probability of default of consumer loans, supporting the dominance of borrower 
selection and risk-shifting over lender selection effects. The finding implies that high 
quality collateral not only signals more credible borrower but also fosters good behavior 
in using loan, enabling bank to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
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1. Introduction 
Lending in low income countries is notoriously risky because of the information 
asymmetry problems which are potentially higher than that of developed countries 
(Menkhoff, Neuberger, & Suwanaporn, 2006). Therefore, collateral has been widely used 
as a mechanism to reduce equilibrium credit rationing and the asymmetric information 
between borrowers and lenders (Haselmann & Wachtel, 2007). Theoretical frameworks 
focus on the different channels that predict the role of collateral in bank lending and 
credit risk. For example, theories relating to ex post contracting frictions (Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981) explain the positive relation between collateral and loan risk with the 
lender selection effect. Alternatively, negative effects of collateral can be explained by a 
borrower selection effect (an ex-ante theory) or by the dominance of risk-shifting and 
loss-mitigating effects in ex-post theories (Berger, Frame, & Ioannidou, 2016). Empirical 
studies provide even more diversified evidence about this relationship, resulting in 
conflicting implications and challenges for policy makers. Berger et al. (2016) argue that 
the strength of each channel is not only dependent on whether loans are protected by 
collateral, but also on the characteristics of loans and types of collateral.  
We revisit this puzzle in the context of a transition economy, Vietnam, where the 
banking sector is heavily reliant on collateral-based lending and where credit risk has 
always been a major concern. Non-performing loans (NPLs) increased sharply after 
2011 and remain serious despite the State Bank of Vietnam’s (SBV) strong efforts in 
bank restructuring and bad debt resolution. Loans in the Vietnamese banking sector are 
primarily secured loans; therefore, collateral plays an essential role in the control of 
NPLs. Although Vietnamese banks insist that lending decisions are based on their 
assessment of borrowers’ payment ability, in practice, collateral is the most important 
consideration in the decision to approve a loan. Banks always request highly liquid 
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collateral from risky borrowers to reduce moral hazard and other ex post frictions and 
protect themselves from loan risks. However, anecdotal evidence shows that heavy 
reliance on collateral may lead to negligence in screening and monitoring processes; 
consequently, leading to substantial increases in bad debt. Since the process of 
collateralized property foreclosure is costly and time-consuming, banks’ loss recovery 
from collateral liquidation has been considered uncertain and unpromising. A different 
view is that collateral is usually a valuable asset in a low-income country like Vietnam. 
Therefore, people tend to make an effort to prevent their asset losses, especially in the 
case of highly desirable collateral. While role of collateral is still debated in the literature 
and practice, empirical studies linking loan risk and collateral in Vietnam may provide 
useful policy implication for bank managers and SBV authorities. 
This study uses a unique data set of 2,295 credit files from the internal loan 
accounts of a Vietnamese commercial bank to examine the impact of collateral 
characteristics on a loan’s probability of default (PD) and the implicit transmission 
channels. We contribute to contemporary literature in many aspects. First, we provide 
additional empirical evidence regarding the role of collateral in lending markets where 
there exists serious information asymmetry associated with weak credit risk 
management, a complex and restrictive regulatory framework and an underdeveloped 
financial infrastructure. Second, this study focuses on consumer loans instead of 
commercial loans and investigates the variation in PD of fully collateralized loans rather 
than comparing secured and non-secured loans. Third, the findings from this study lend 
support to Berger et al. (2016) in explaining different risk-collateral relations implied by 
economic theory. The identification of specific risk-shifting and borrower selection 
channels suggests effective policy intervention for both credit risk resolution and 
financial inclusion enhancement in this transition economy.  
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2. Literature Review on the Relationship Between Collateral Pledging and Loan 
Risk 
There are two strands of theories that explain different effects of collateral on loan 
risk. The ex ante theories suggest that good borrowers are willing to pledge more and 
desirable collateral to signal their underlying quality and get lower risk premiums. They 
choose to pledge collateral in order to avoid screening cost of banks (Bester, 1985).  
Pagano, Manove, and Padilla (2001) argue that in equilibrium, banks screen all projects, 
but fund the good ones only and charge an interest rate which is equal to the cost of 
funds plus the screening cost of that approved project and the prorated share of the 
screening cost of all unapproved projects. Banks tend to loosen the screening process if 
they are highly protected by collateral. Hence, a negative relation between collateral 
pledging and credit risk is a consequence of a borrower selection effect. However, the 
collateral-risk relation can be also analyzed from the ex post point of view via lender 
selection, risk shifting and loss mitigation effects. The lender selection effect implies that 
collateral is a part of optimal risk contract as banks require low quality 
borrowers/projects to pledge collateral to reduce moral hazard and other ex post 
frictions and protect themselves from loan risks (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). The risk-
shifting effect comes from the borrowers’ motivation to shift into a safer investment 
portfolio to avoid asset loss, whereas the loss mitigation effect is that collateral pledges 
reduce losses for the lender in the event of borrower default.  
Voluminous empirical studies have tested the risk-collateral relation, but the 
findings are even more conflicting. Berger and Udell (1990) examine the role of 
collateral in explaining credit risk of 460 US banks and find that collateral is most often 
associated with riskier borrowers; hence riskier loans and banks. This confirms 
conventional wisdom in the banking community that banks require higher risk-
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borrowers to pledge collaterals to avoid credit frictions. This positive relationship 
between collateral and default risk has been supported by vast number of studies across 
countries (Brick & Palia, 2007; Godlewski & Weill, 2011; Jiménez & Saurina, 2004; John, 
Lynch, & Puri, 2003; Machauer & Weber, 1998), suggesting the dominance of lender 
selection explained by ex post theories.  
However, the literature on relationship lending shows that the role of pledged 
collateral depends on the proximity between bank and borrower (Cerqueiro, Ongena, & 
Roszbach, 2016). The effect of collateral in different lending relationships has been 
investigated. Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) find that the risk premium is lower in 
collateralized loans, implying that banks use collateral to solve the problem of hidden 
information in designing optimal debt contracts, i.e. collateralized loans have a lower 
interest rate and non-collateralized loans a higher rate. Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) 
provide evidence of the negative relationship between collateral and risk in Belgian banks, 
supporting the theoretical explanation that a “main bank” often requires collateral to limit 
the borrowers’ ability to obtain future loans from other lenders and reduce the risk of 
excessive future borrowing (Mann, 1997). No correlation between collateral and loan risk 
is found in Elsas and Krahnen (2000) who test the relationship between borrower quality 
and the incidence of collateral in top five German banks. They conclude that collateral is 
required primarily by lenders that have a previous relation with borrowers in order to lock 
borrowers in to the relation and therefore increase the bargaining power of banks in the 
future renegotiation. Cressy and Toivanen (2001) also find no evidence of significant 
relationship between default and collateral requirement for UK banks. 
Berger et al. (2016) argues that contradictory empirical findings about the 
relationship between collateral pledging and loan risk arise from different data samples 
with different types and characteristics of collateral. Instead of comparing secured and 
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unsecured loans, they investigate the effect of the underlying collateral characteristics 
on loan risk and find that liquid collateral is associated with especially low risk premium 
and that these loans perform better than those backed by illiquid collateral or no 
collateral. One part of their findings supports ex ante theories while the other part is 
consistent with ex post theories. Japhet and Memba (2015) examine the types of 
collateral which are preferred by banks in Kenya in order to reduce loan risk. They find 
that motor vehicles are preferred to land and buildings since the process of liquidating 
land and building usually involve complicated legal procedures and higher costs. This 
finding leads to a conclusion that the more liquid and desirable collateral is, the lower 
the loan’s PD is. Some other papers analyze the effects of individual economic features 
and collateral types on loan rate premium (Benmelech & Bergman, 2009, 2011; 
Benmelech, Garmaise, & Moskowitz, 2005; John et al., 2003). The empirical results from 
those studies confirm that collateral characteristics have different risk implications for 
different types of borrowers. 
Overall, the literature on the economic function of collateral on default risk is 
extensive, however there are discrepancies in the empirical evidence given the 
differences in economic environment, bank behavior and especially collateral 
characteristics. Additionally, the empirical evidence comes primarily from studies in 
developed countries with limited research focus on emerging markets and transition 
economies due to data limitations. Also, a vast number of studies investigate this 
relationship for commercial loans while ignoring consumer loans. One reason is that 
information about individual borrowers is almost impossible to obtain. However, it is 
argued that consumer loans suffer more serious problem of information asymmetry that 
induces banks to require collateral as the first and most important factor in determining 
whether or not loan applications are accepted.  
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 In an effort to seek more robust evidence from a transition economy with a 
collateral-based lending environment, this study uses a unique dataset of 2,295 
consumer loan accounts from Vietnam to answer the following research questions:   
To what extent, does the collateral quality affect a loan’s default risk, and hence 
banks’ lending decisions?  
How do empirical estimates of the collateral effect on loan risk relate the theoretical 
assumptions about the specific transmission mechanism? 
3. Collateral-Based Lending in Vietnam 
In Vietnam, the presence of severe information asymmetry, weak credit 
information system, poor risk management, and underdeveloped financial 
infrastructure has resulted in a heavy reliance on collateral in bank lending. Collateral 
becomes an essential factor that affects lending decisions by Vietnamese banks, 
especially for loans provided to households and individuals (Figure 1). Like other 
transition economies, the banking sector recently shifted their lending to enterprises to 
collateralized lending to households, which accounts for much of the growth in credit 
(Bonin, Hasan, & Wachtel, 2014). Good collateral is believed to be a mitigating factor to 
deal with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Menkhoff et al., 2006) 
and help to increase access to credit (Alvarez de la Campa, 2011). During the reform 
process, the Vietnamese government has been undertaking strong effort to improve the 
credit environment and facilitate collateral-based lending. The promulgation of the 2005 
Civil Code and Decree 163-2006/ND-CP was a significant step to promote secured 
transactions and asset-based lending in line with international practices. This legal 
framework allows all kinds of assets (i.e. immovable and movable assets, tangible and 
intangible assets) to be used as collateral and gives secured-creditors the right to seize 
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or sell collateral privately (not through an auction) when the debtor defaults. The 
collateral-registry system has also been upgraded and computerized.  
However, secured credit granted against movable assets is still limited in Vietnam 
although there has been a substantial increase since the launch of new centralized online 
registry for movable assets in 2012. The lack of knowledge and experience on movable 
asset-based lending, adequate legal framework and effective asset monitoring is 
considered to be main obstacles. This problem has not only existed in the credit 
environment of Vietnam but also in many developing countries according to the World 
Bank. Lending in Vietnam is biased toward real estate, the most preferable collateral by 
commercial banks. The continuing real estate fever contributes to increases in this 
desirable type of asset. Although the price of housing has been soaring to almost 
unbelievable heights year by year, there is always substantial demand for real estate, 
especially in big and crowed cities of HCM and Hanoi.  









Notes: (*) Including mini-companies, (**) CIC represents Credit Information Center 
Source: IFC-VBA Financial Sector Survey in “Vietnam Increasing Access to Credit Through 
Collateral (Secured Transactions Reform)” 
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Source: IFC-VBA Financial Sector Survey in “Vietnam Increasing Access to Credit Through 
Collateral (Secured Transactions Reform)” 
  
Figure 2 provides statistics of top five assets used as collateral by commercial banks 
for all loan types in Vietnam from WB-IFC and Vietnam Bankers Association’s financial 
sector survey of lending practice in Vietnam (IFC-VBA Financial Sector Survey)1. 
Questionnaires were sent to 89 bank and non-bank financial institutions in Vietnam. The 
result reveals a strong preference toward real estate since this type of asset was selected as 
the most preferred collateral by 93% of surveyed financial institutions followed by 
machinery and equipment, chosen by more than 60% of financial institutions. While 
machinery and equipment are the most preferred movable assets as collateral, securities 
are among the least desirable collateral with the lowest quality ranking. Unlike developed 
markets where securities are considered one of the most liquid assets, Vietnamese 
commercial banks are more cautions and reluctant to accept securities since the stock 
                                                          
1 This is a part of a project conducted by IFC's Mekong Private Sector Development Facility (MPDF), the 
Investment Climate Advisory Service (FIAS) in association with the Vietnam Bankers' Association in 2006. 
The survey captures baseline data regarding private sector lending practices in order to measure and 
monitor the legal reforms' progress and impact. The report was published in “Vietnam – Increasing Access to 
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market is still in the early stage of development. Some big banks have recently offered 
stock-collateralized loans but the loan volume has not exceeded 50% of the stocks’ market 
value. In many cases, movable assets are accepted as a supplementary collateral when the 
value of the primary collateral (generally real estate) is not sufficient. 
Pledging collateral does not necessarily require transfer of possession but there is 
collateral registry maintained by government agencies. Under the document registration 
system, a debtor has to sign a written-agreement about the use of assets as collateral and 
the associated secured obligation. However, upon default by the borrower, the real 
property foreclosure process is burdensome and time-consuming. The absence of clarity in 
the country’s laws on collateral repossession is another obstacle. The procedure for banks 
to exercise the rights to sell or dispose of collateralized property is controlled by court 
judgments. Therefore, loss mitigation from collateral recovery is still questionable.  
4. Methodology and Data 
We examine the effect of the collateral quality on the PD of individual loans using 
data from 2,295 credit files collected from the internal loan accounts of a commercial 
bank in Vietnam2. The filtering process for data from individual loan accounts is based 
on the following criteria: (i) loans were first initiated in the years 2010, 2011, 2012 and 
matured before 03/31/2016; (ii) loans have short and medium terms (from 12 to 60 
months); (iii) loan amount is at least VND 100 million (about USD 4,500);  (iv) each loan 
account is secured by only one asset and this asset is used as a collateral for that loan 
account at each point of time; (v) locations where loans are applied and approved are 
Hanoi and HCMC, the two biggest and most important cities of administration and 
business in Vietnam. 
                                                          
2 This type of data is highly confidential so the scope of this study is narrow but this unique data set helps 
avoid heterogeneous effects among banks. 
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In this sample, collateral quality is ranked based on the bank’s internal policy on 
collateral classification and ranking which is based on the collateral type, its desirability 
to the lender and discounted risk level of collateral value. Collateral is relatively 
diversified in terms of types, for example: (i) deposits, account balance, papers issued by 
financial institutions, (ii) residential real-estates, (iii) agricultural land, (iv) factory and 
warehouse, (v) transportation vehicles, (vi) machinery & equipment, (vii) securities 
(bonds and stocks)… Sub-classification among these collateral types is even more 
diversified and complicated as it also depends on liquidity level and underlying 
discounted risks. Assets of the same type are not always categorized in the same group 
and rank. For example, residential real-estate is classified based on its location with 
most desirable or highest rank assigned to urban frontage houses and residential land 
located in the center of HCMC or Hanoi. Residential real-estates are downgraded to 
lower levels if they are suburban houses/land and/or located in the alley or far from the 
city infrastructure or in other provinces. Transportation vehicles are also classified and 
raked based on their brand names, number of years in use, size and function categories. 
In other words, sub-classification in one asset type is more likely driven by its liquidity.  
This paper follows Berger et al. (2016), applying Probit regression model to 
examine the effect of the collateral’s quality level on the PD of individual loans. In theory, 
a borrower will default if the utility that he/she expects to obtain when default is greater 
than not default. Call y*it is the difference in the utility mentioned above and y*it is non-
observable. A borrower will default if y*it >0, suggesting that borrower get higher utility 
in case of default.  
The empirical model is then developed as follows: 
𝒚𝒊𝒕
∗ =  𝜶 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷 +  𝒛𝒊𝒕
′  𝜸 +  𝒘𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜴 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕  (𝟏) 
where: 
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  𝑦𝑖𝑡 is default decision of borrower i who get a loan in year t, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is an endogenous 
variable and dichotomous, such that  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = {
1,  𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≥ 0 
0,  𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ < 0 
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 =  1. 2. … . 𝑛. In this study, 
dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a proxy for loan risk or 𝑒𝑥 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 nonperformance which takes 
the value of 1 if loan i generated in year t is in default and 0 otherwise. A loan is in 
default if it is downgraded to the rank 3-5 or is overdue more than 90 days during the 
loan term according to 493/2005/QĐ-NHNN, and 18/2007/QĐ-NHNN regulations that 
were promulgated by SBV3; 
𝑥′𝑖𝑡 are variables representing collateral characteristics including collateral ranks 
based on quality levels, coverage ratio and ownership status. Collateral quality is 
decided based on the internal rating policy of bank. Our sample consists of six rating 
classes, ranking from 1 to 6. The highest rank is 6, representing the most preferential or 
highest quality collateral while the lowest rank of 1 includes least desirable collateral. 
Coverage ratio is measured by the ratio between collateral value and loan volume, 
implying the protected level of loan. In another words, we concern the level of coverage 
that collateral provides for the loan. The ownership status is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if the collateral is owned by the borrower and 0 otherwise4. 
𝑧′𝑖𝑡  is a set of variables of loan characteristics including loan term, loan size 
(volume), and interest rate; 
w’t is a vector of control variables for borrower characteristics such as borrower’s 
profession, borrowing purposes and regional factors; 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term;  
                                                          
3 These documents regulated the debt classification and provision that applied for financial institutions in 
Vietnam.  
4 Banks also accept the collateral which is owned by borrower’s family members, e.g. spouse, mother, farther, 
children, brothers/sisters.  
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It is widely addressed in the literature that loan contract terms (loan size, 
maturity, interest rate, collateral…) are endogenous and  jointly determined by 
borrower characteristics and lending policies (Plaut, 1985). In this case, the correlation 
between the regressors and the error term is not zero (E (z’, 𝜀) ≠ 0), so that the probit 
model estimation can be biased because of endogeneity. To address this issue, we 
estimate the endogenous probit model using instrumental variables (instrument 
variable probit, IVP) proposed by (Newey, 1987, 1990). We assume that loan 
characteristics (size, interest rate, maturity) are endogenous regressors and 
instrumental variables include borrowers’ characteristics, borrowing purposes, 
collateral and potential difference in lending policies from year to year.  
Interpreting the magnitudes of probit coefficients is not straightforward, because 
it depends on the slope of the cumulative distribution function (CDF). We, therefore 
compute the average marginal effects of explanatory variables on the probabilities, i.e. 
the changes in the response probabilities as a result of one-unit change in the 
explanatory variables. These marginal effects (ME) are calculated as: 
𝑴𝑬 =  𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝒚 =  𝟏|𝒙, 𝒙𝒌  =  𝟏)–  𝑷𝒓(𝒚 = 𝟏|𝒙, 𝒙𝒌  =  𝟎) (𝟐) 
The definitions of variables are presented in Table 1 while Table 2 describes the 
distribution of loan delinquency (PD) according to each explanatory variable. 
Accordingly, most collateral in sample belong to rank 5 with 1,166 observations, or 
50.81% of the loan accounts. The default rate is high (>30%) for ranks 1 – 3 but declines 
with increasing quality level. In order to have more insight regarding the distribution of 
the coverage ratio, we classify the sample into three categories. Cover1 represents the 
highest coverage level in which loan volume is less than 50% of collateral value. Cover2 
consists of loans which have volume from 50 – 75% of collateral value while Cover3 
includes loans with volume higher than 75% of collateral value. But the statistics appear 
- 14 - 
 
to be ambiguous as default rate is highest in Cover1 (extremely high value of collaterals) 
but significantly drops in Cover2 and slightly increases in Cover3. Table 2 also shows 
that bigger loan size and highly protected loan are riskier. Also, borrowers of short-term 
loan have higher PD.  
Table 1 – Definition of variables 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent variables (yit) 
Default risk 
(Loan’s PD) 
Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a loan is downgraded to the 
level of 3 - 5 or loan is overdue more than 90 days, and 0 otherwise 
Collateral characteristics (𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ ) 
Corank1-6 Collateral quality is a categorical variable proxied by a series of 
dummies representing six ranking classes (1 to 6) according to 
bank’s internal ranking policy. 
Coverage  Coverage ratio is measured by the ratio between collateral value and 
loan volume, implying the protected level of loan.  
Ownership Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if collateral is owned by 
borrower and 0 if it owned by borrower’s family members. 
Loan characteristics (𝒛𝒊𝒕
′ ) 
Loanterm Number of months between loan origination and maturity  
Loansize Loan size is calculated by the natural logarithm of loan volume. 
Interest Average interest rate of loans per 3 months during loan term (%). 
Control variables (wit) 
Profession Three dummy variables are constructed to represent three different 
groups of borrowers’ professions: Trade, Service and Nonbusiness. 
Borrowers classified in Nonbusiness group are workers, employees in 
government agencies and companies. 
Purpose Four dummy variables are constructed represent different purposes of 
lending from borrowers, such that:  
• Pconsum: borrowing for consumption purpose 
• Pestate: borrowing to buy residential house or flat 
• Pbusiness: borrowing for working capital supplement in private 
business of borrower 
• Pother: other purposes such as investment  
Location(HCM) The dummy variable takes the value of 1 if loan was applied and 
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generated in HCMC and 0 if it was in Hanoi.   
Year Time (dummy variables) when loan was originated. This is to control 
for the difference in lending policies from year to year 
 
Table 2 – The distribution of the sample 
Collateral rank 
Default 
No. of loans 
Default 
rate 0 1 
Colrank1 37 20 57 0.35 
2 70 45 115 0.39 
3 288 141 429 0.33 
4 278 62 340 0.18 
5 1,021 145 1,166 0.12 
6 162 26 188 0.14 
Coverage 
Cover1 1,011 313 1,324 0.24 
Cover2 506 55 561 0.10 
Cover3 163 37 200 0.19 
Loanterm (months) 
12 1,011 313 1,324 0.24 
36 506 55 561 0.10 
48 163 37 200 0.19 
60 176 34 210 0.16 
Loansize (mil. VND) 
Size1 ≤ 500 1,211 159 1,370 0.12 
Size2: 500 − 1,000 401 103 504 0.20 
Size3> 1,000 244 177 421 0.42 
 
Descriptive statistics of collateral quality, loan size, loan term, and interest rate are 
summarized in Table 3 which shows the wide heterogeneity in the data sample. The 
mean of collateral preference is 4.3 which show the dominance of quality ranks of 4 - 6 
(highly desirable and qualified assets). The coverage ratio ranges from 1 to 65, implying 
that all loans are fully secured by collateral value. The loan interest rate varies from 16% 
to 26%. Loan volumes less than VND 1 bil. dominates the sample with its mean value of 
VND 678,7 million (USD 30,850 approximately). The majority of loans in the sample are 
short-term loans (1 year). Seventy percent of loans are in HCMC and the loan purpose is 
mainly for business (more than 50%).  
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of collateral and loan characteristics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Colrank1-6 4.310 1.162 1 6 
Coverage 2.891 3.395 1.082 65.8 
Loansize 
(VND mil.) 678.717 841.605 100 30,000 
Loanterm 
(months) 25.396 16.89 12 60 
Interest  0.219 0.031 0.16 0.26 
Location 0.715 0.452 0 1 
Pbusiness 0.553 0.497 0 1 
Pconsum 0.228 0.419 0 1 
Pestate 0.107 0.309 0 1 
Pother 0.078 0.268 0 1 
 
5. Empirical Results 
We run three estimations of the IVP model (1 - 3) and report the full information of 
regression output in Table 4. In each regression, we include each of loan characteristic 
variable to avoid the problem of multicollinearity. The set of instruments includes 
variables representing collateral, borrowers’ characteristics and difference in loan 
policies from year to year (time dummies). These factors are assumed to endogenously 
affect loan contract terms (interest, loan size and maturity). The maximum likelihood 
estimation results show that our variables of interest, collateral quality (rank 4-6) and 
coverage ratio, are statistically significant at the confidence level of 95% and 99% 
respectively, supporting the hypothesis that collateral characteristics can explain the 
variation in loan default risk of the investigated bank. The negative sign of coefficients 
on these variables suggest that loan secured by more desirable collateral has lower risk.  
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Table 4 – IVP regression on loan’s PD 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Colateral characterstics 
 Colrank 
               2 -0.219 -0.215 -0.228 
 
(0.218) (0.218) (0.228) 
            3 -0.323* -0.302 -0.322 
 
(0.191) (0.192) (0.201) 
           4 -0.469** -0.480** -0.509**   
 
(0.196) (0.197) (0.204) 
           5 -0.721*** -0.698*** -0.754*** 
 
(0.185) (0.185) (0.194) 
          6 -0.488** -0.483** -0.647***  
 
(0.216) (0.217) (0.239) 
Coverage -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.044***  
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
Ownership 0.082 0.099 0.086 
 








                
Loanterm 
 
-0.005                 
  




   
(0.338) 
Control variables 
Nonbusiness -0.609*** -0.488*** -0.464*** 
 
(0.073) (0.104) (0.114) 
Service -0.424*** -0.378*** -0.352***  
 
(0.095) (0.098) (0.116) 
Location(HCM) -0.760*** -0.791*** -0.702*** 
 
(0.076) (0.075) (0.089) 
Constant 0.495 0.716*** -0.799 
 
(0.338) (0.203) (1.045) 
Log likelihood 6409.39 -9130.44 -1181.87 
Wald chi2 290.940 292.27 271.42 
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5 – Marginal effect (ME) of IVP estimation 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Colrank             
             2  -0.068 (0.069)  -0.069 (0.069) -0.050 (0.071) 
             3  -0.098 (0.061) -0.096 (0.061)  -0.081 (0.063) 
             4  -0.137**  (0.062) -0.142**  (0.062) -0.131** (0.062) 
             5  -0.195*** (0.059)  -0.193***  (0.059)  -0.196*** (0.060) 
             6 -0.142** (0.066) -0.143*** (0.066) -0.199*** (0.065) 
Coverage  -0.016***  (0.003) -0.016*** (0.003) -0.006 (0.003) 
Ownership 0.019 (0.021) 0.022 (0.021)  0.019  0.020) 
Interest 0.200 (0.292) 
    Loanterm 
  
-0.001 (0.001) 
  Loansize 
    
0.257*** (0.070) 
Nonbusiness -0.142*** (0.016) -0.115***  (0.024) -0.093*** (0.027) 
Service  -0.099*** (0.022) -0.090***  (0.022)  -0.056** (0.026) 
Location(HCM) -0.178*** (0.016) -0.184*** (0.017)  -0.127*** (0.021) 
Pconsum .0001 (0.000) 0.002*** (0.001)  0.018*** (0.003) 
Pbusiness .0003*** (0.000) 0.017*** (0.001)  -0.028*** (0.003) 
Pestate .0001*** (0.000) -0.001 (0.001)  -0.005 (0.003) 
Year2011 -.0001 (0.000) 0.008*** (0.000)  -0.011*** (0.002) 
Year2012 0.003*** (0.000) 0.008*** (0.000) -0.013*** (0.003) 
Note: Probability of positive outcome, dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** and ** denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
 
The calculation of average marginal effect presented in Table 5 reveals that 
collateral belonging to rating class of 4-6 helps to reduce a loan’s PD from 1.31 to 1.99 
percent point comparing to collateral in rating 1, ceteris paribus. However, there is no 
significant difference on the PD of loan secured by collateral ranked from 1 to 3. 
Additionally, 1 percent increase in coverage ratio may lead to a drop in PD by 0.6 – 1.6 
basis point. This finding is relatively consistent with that of Berger et al. (2016) for the 
case of Bolivia and supports the dominance of borrower selection and risk-shifting over 
lender selection effects. Accordingly, borrowers who pledge more desirable and higher 
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value collateral are more careful to select investment projects and exert efforts in using 
bank loan efficiently to prevent asset loss in the case of default. In other words, they 
have less incentive to default than ones who pledge with less desirable collateral. 
Furthermore, wealthier borrowers are more likely to pledge valuable assets as collateral 
to obtain better terms in loan contract; they therefore have better capacity for loan 
repayment. This finding is inconsistent with the theoretical explanation in Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) that wealthy borrowers are those who have succeeded at risky endeavors, 
then the riskiness of loans may increase if they are protected by collateral with higher 
value. Since our data sample does not include bad debt recovery from collateral 
liquidation, there is no evidence regarding the loss mitigation effect.  
Beside collateral quality, credit risk is significantly driven by borrowers’ 
profession and regional factor. The coefficient on profession variables indicate that 
borrowers who own their business are riskier than employees in government agencies 
and companies because their income are more stable and less affected by the business 
cycle. In term of regional effects, we find that loan’s PD in HCMC is significantly lower 
than that of Hanoi. However, the effects of loan characteristic variables appear to be 
insignificant in all estimation. This finding seems to be inconsistent with existing 
literature (Jiménez & Saurina, 2004; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) but reflects the poor lending 
practice in Vietnam that loan contract terms have been not optimally designed and that 
credit evaluation and risk management play no significant role in lending decisions.  
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Motivated by Berger et al. (2016)’s explanation for the conflicting results of the 
collateral-risk relation in the literature, this study investigates the impact of collateral 
characteristics on loan default probability and transmission channels of this effect at the 
commercial banks in Vietnam. We use the IVP analysis on pooled data of 2,295 
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individual credit files to seek answers for two research questions: (i) To what extent, 
does the collateral quality affect a loan’s default risk, and hence banks’ lending decisions? 
and (ii) How do empirical estimates of the collateral effect on loan risk relate the 
theoretical assumptions about the specific transmission mechanism? For the first 
questions, we find that collateral of high quality helps to reduce the PD of a loan. 
Specifically, default risk is likely to be heterogeneous within rating classes of collateral 
such that highly desirable collateral not only signals more credible borrower but also 
fosters good behavior in investment behaviour, enabling bank to mitigate adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems. The empirical results also answer our second 
question regarding the transmission channels, confirming the dominance of borrower 
selection and risk-shifting over lender selection effects of collateral for the case of 
Vietnam. Moreover, default risk is also dependent on borrower’s profession and regional 
factor, suggesting important implication in customer and market targeting in developing 
credit strategies for commercia banks.  
 The findings from this paper may provide possible explanation for the collateral-
based lending and borrower behavior in Vietnam, the market associated with serious 
information asymmetries as consequences of weak credit risk management, ineffective 
public records, restrictive and complicated regulatory environment and underdeveloped 
information infrastructure. The use of collateral not only increases households’ access to 
credit and boost financial inclusion but it also generates strong risk-reducing incentives 
for borrower. Therefore, an adequate secured lending framework supported by effective 
collateral laws and registries is essential to improve lending environment. Despite SBV 
and government has undertaken strong efforts to create a sound legal and institutional 
infrastructure to maximize the economic potential of assets that can be used as 
collateral, the implementation has not been sufficiently effective. Reform should be 
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conducted to provide clear rules on priority for the secured creditor and enforcement of 
security upon default.  
However, heavy reliance on collateral may increase banks’ appetite for risk-taking. 
As commercial banks in Vietnam have been increasingly providing mortgage loans 
which are proved to be prone to the swings in asset prices and increase the economic 
vulnerability. The period of 2010 – 2012 experienced an incredible increase in bad debts 
in Viet Nam as a consequence of falling housing price. This situation is similar to that of 
Thailand in 1997 and the US during 2007 – 2009, which has raised a big concern for SBV 
to develop monitoring and supervision mechanism to control subprime mortgage credit.  
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